The European Union (EU) has recently embarked on an assertive industrial policy to boost its economic competitiveness, foster strategic autonomy, and decarbonize the European economy. While existing literature has thoroughly explained why the EU’s industrial policy turn came about, much less is known about how the Union pursues this novel policy, and which effects this produces on interest groups, member states, and the rate of decarbonization. This project bridges these two research gaps by studying the political economy of the EU’s green industrial policy.

First, the project sheds light on how the EU approaches its industrial policy. An original typology of the Union’s industrial policy instruments is created, based on the characteristics of each instrument type, such as its level of implementation (national or supranational), offensive or defensive traits, etc. Through this typology, the project explains why the EU favors certain types of instruments (e.g. supranational, defensive trade restrictions and national, offensive subsidies) over others (e.g. supranational, offensive EU funding for net-zero technologies). In a second step, the project assesses which winners and losers the EU’s industrial policy produces, by studying how these instrument types divergently affect interests groups, EU member states, and the green transition.